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Date: April 30, 2024 Tue
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Results for public disorder
20 results foundAuthor: Dandurand, Yvon Title: Confident Policing in a Troubled Community: Evaluation of the Vancouver Police Department's City-wide Enforcement Team Initiative: A Report prepared for the City of VAncouver and the Vancouver Agreement Coordination Unit Summary: This evaluation, sponsored by the Vancouver Agreement Coordination Unit, was designed to assess the impact of the Vancouver Police Department’s City-Wide Enforcement Team (CET) initiative implemented in the Downtown Eastside (DTES) area of the city during the during the months of April-September, 2003. The CET followed a number of previous police interventions in the area that targeted the drug trade and was initiated after a planning process that included an unsuccessful attempt to secure additional fiscal support from the City Council. The CET had three primary objectives: 1) to bring order to a disordered community; 2) to disrupt the open drug market; and, 3) to disrupt the flow of stolen property into the DTES. These objectives were to be achieved by providing an enhanced police presence in the area in an attempt to disperse drug dealers and their user-clients and, in doing so, reduce the levels of disorder and increase safety and security in the area. The CET represented a dramatic departure from the previous “containment” approach wherein policing services were provided to the DTES on a primarily reactive basis. Senior police personnel viewed the initiative as a long-delayed fulfillment of their legislated mandate to provide full policing services to the residents of the DTES. To assess the effectiveness of the CET, in-depth interviews were conducted community residents, business owners, incarcerated offenders, health care professionals, the police officers who were assigned to the DTES at the time the CET was implemented, and IV drug users. In addition, systematic field observations were conducted in the DTES during a three month period and focus group sessions were conducted with community residents, persons involved in the delivery of social services, sex trade workers, and members of NGOs in the DTES. Statistical information from the Vancouver Police Department Computer Aided Dispatch system (CAD), the PRIME record system, the pawnshop data base, as well as from other agencies, including Vancouver Fire and Rescue Services, B.C. Ambulance Service, the Coroner’s Office, and hospital admission data were retrieved and analyzed. The results of the analysis indicate that the CET was successful in disrupting the open drug market, reducing the general levels of social disorder, and enhancing the general feelings of safety and security among persons who live and work in the DTES. The CET was less successful in pursuing drug dealers and the associated criminal activity that was displaced into other areas in District 2 and into adjacent police districts. There is some evidence that the drug market in the DTES adapted to the increased police presence, becoming more orderly, dispersed and moving out of the public realm into private locations. The price and availability of drugs in the area were not significantly impacted. Drug dealers and their clients who were displaced to other areas created localized crime “hot spots” of drug dealing and associated disorder, although this occurred in the context of overall declines in drug and public disorder offences in all police districts in the city during the last nine months of 2003 as compared with the same time period in 2002. With respect to potential detrimental effects of the initiative, there is no evidence that the CET had a measurable impact on the number of fatal drug overdoses in the DTES or adversely affected IV drug users with respect to their access to HIV prevention, needle exchange and other services. Nor is there evidence that the risk behaviour of IV drug users was influenced by the CET initiative in a way that noticeably increased public health risks. The data that were gathered for the evaluation did not allow a determination of whether the CET was successful in interfering with the flow of stolen property into the DTES, although the stolen property market was forced to become more discrete and more of the stolen property may have been fenced out of the immediate DTES area. Police officers, community residents, IV drug users, and others who offered an opinion on the subject shared the view that the stolen property market had not been significantly reduced. Senior police personnel, based on their observations, believed that the flow of stolen property as it existed prior to the CET had been impacted and cited the Extract data to support their view that the quality and value of stolen goods flowing into the DTES had declined. The attempt by the project team to assess the impact of the CET on the stolen property market in the DTES was hindered by methodological difficulties. There was general support among community residents, business owners, sex trade workers, and IV drug users for the increased police presence in the area and with the performance of the police. There was also an expressed desire that the police enhance their relations with the community through expanded foot patrols and increased training to better equip officers to effectively police the area. Some concern was expressed about the policing styles of some officers assigned to the area. Residents were divided as to whether the overall quality of life in the community had improved, although their overall feelings of safety and security had increased. The effectiveness of the CET was compromised to some extent by insufficient coordination and joint planning with other agencies and organizations in the DTES, a lack of departmental resources, and by some inconsistency in the policing strategies used by officers in the DTES. The results of the study also indicated that the CET would have benefited from a comprehensive communication strategy to increase the awareness of community residents and business owners and others involved in the delivery of services in the area. A major limitation of this evaluation is that the survey interview data were gathered six months after the CET initiative was implemented and it can be expected that this short time frame is sufficient only to capture certain facets of any changes in community life in the DTES. It is difficult to determine the extent to which medium and long-term changes are occurring and whether these changes are permanent or ephemeral. It is also unrealistic to expect that the dynamics of life in a community, where crime and disorder had become deeply entrenched, would be significantly and measurably altered in six months as a consequence of one initiative such as the CET. It can be expected that the dynamics of life in the DTES will continue to evolve and that specific initiatives, such as the CET, will evolve as well. The special initiative did serve a number of purposes, one of which was for the VPD, as an organization, to accept and acknowledge its responsibility to challenge its own long-standing policy of “containment” and to move proactively to provide effective policing services to the DTES community and to attempt to improve the overall quality of life for all of its residents. Details: Abbotsford, BC: University College of the Fraser Valley, 2004. 251p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 29, 2010 at: http://www.vancouveragreement.ca/wp-content/uploads/ConfidentPolicing2004sm.pdf Year: 2004 Country: Canada URL: http://www.vancouveragreement.ca/wp-content/uploads/ConfidentPolicing2004sm.pdf Shelf Number: 120152 Keywords: DisplacementDrug DealersDrug EnforcementOpen-Air Drug MarketsPolice-Community RelationsPolicing (Vancouver, Canada)Public DisorderStolen Goods |
Author: Riots Communities and Victims Panel (U.K.) Title: After the Riots: The Final Report of the Riots Communities and Victims Panel Summary: The independent Panel set up to explore the causes of the riots in England last year has presented its final report to the Prime Minister, Deputy Prime Minister and Leader of the Official Opposition. The report makes wide-ranging public policy recommendations which the Panel argue must be enacted together, to ensure the risk of future riots seen on the scale of last August can be significantly reduced. The cross party Panel’s findings are based on research in communities, and consultation with third sector organisations and social enterprises, local authorities, and private sector employers. Many people the Panel spoke to shared a concern about a lack of opportunities for young people, poor parenting, a lack of shared values and sense of responsibility among some, an inability of the justice system to prevent re-offending, concerns about brands and materialism and issues relating to confidence in the police. The wide ranging issues and recommendations tackled in the Panel's final report include: •Families aren’t getting the support they need. The Panel supports the Government’s Troubled Families Programme, but found that the overlap with rioters is limited. Government and local public services should develop a strategy incorporating the principles of the Troubled Families Programme to help 500,000 ‘forgotten families’ turn their lives around. •Communities told the Panel that young people need to build character to help them realise their potential and to prevent them making poor decisions, like rioting. Schools should assume responsibility for helping children build character. •Children are leaving school unable to read and write – one fifth of school leavers have the literacy skills of an eleven year old, or younger. Where schools fail to teach children to read and write they should pay a financial penalty, used to help the pupil ‘catch up’. •Communities and young people told the Panel that having a job is key to people feeling that they have a stake in society. Government and local public services should fund together a ‘Youth Job Promise’ scheme to get young people a job, when they have been unemployed for a year. Details: London: Riots Communities and Victims Panel, 2012. 148p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 29, 2012 at: http://riotspanel.independent.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/03/Riots-Panel-Final-Report1.pdf Year: 2012 Country: United Kingdom URL: http://riotspanel.independent.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/03/Riots-Panel-Final-Report1.pdf Shelf Number: 124765 Keywords: Economic ConditionsFamiliesPublic DisorderRiots (U.K.)Social Conditions |
Author: Frazier Group, LLC Title: Independent Investigation Occupy Oakland Response October 25, 2011 Summary: On October 10, 2011, a group identifying itself as Occupy Oakland set up an encampment in front of Oakland City Hall in Frank Ogawa Plaza Park (FOP Park). The group erected approximately 147 tents, kitchen and restroom facilities, child care areas, posted dozens of banners, and claimed the park as their own. At that time, the City of Oakland sought to accommodate the group in the exercise of their First Amendment rights of expression. However, as time progressed, there were legitimate concerns - mostly supported by evidence - on behalf of city officials for the health, safety and welfare of people in the FOP Park, city employees, and community members. One official who had detailed knowledge of devolving conditions stated "The totality of circumstances was untenable." In short, these concerns included but were not limited to: Health and Welfare - trash and debris were excessive, human and animal waste was observed in excavated holes and buckets, portable bathrooms were too few and un-serviced, rodents were populating the Park, and food preparation and provision were occurring in unsanitary conditions. Safety - illegal and non-permitted electrical hookups were made and structures indicating permanence were erected. Fire inspectors voiced concerns regarding the presence of propane tanks, open-flame cooking, plus cooking and smoking inside tents. A victim who fell from a structure was carried away from the Park for treatment because occupants would not allow fire/medical personnel access. Police officers who attempted to walk through the Park were confronted and told to leave. Attitudes graduated toward aggression and violence. City employees3 were complaining about harassment and concerns for their personal safety. Media reported that a teacher who had occupied the camp was attacked and choked, and a reporter was attacked by a dog and then confronted and told to leave. There were concerns about an alleged sexual assault within the Park, a homeless individual who was beaten with a board, and obvious use of drugs and alcohol. Individuals in the Park felt threatened when they were confronted by groups and told to not communicate with government officials. One government official who attempted to liaison with members of Occupy during a march was told by the marchers he was lucky they did not beat him or spit on him. During the later afternoon hours, the population of the Park increased to the degree where clustering was problematic, tempers flared, arguments ensued, and people within the Park had to intervene to prevent escalation. An effort to identify leadership of Occupy, and then establish a working, collaborative relationship between Occupy and City officials, was a priority of the City from the very early stages of the movement in the Park. A city representative feels that Occupy never allowed this relationship to develop, and in fact Occupy members ensured that it deteriorated over time. City of Oakland Officials became increasingly concerned about conditions within the encampment, and the OPD was directed to develop an eviction plan. On October 25, 2011 beginning at approximately 5:00 AM, 392 OPD and 202 mutual aid personnel responded to 14th and Broadway Streets. Their purpose was execution of the OPD plan to evict the Occupy movement from both FOP Park and from Snow Park. In the early evening, Occupy Oakland clashed with the Oakland Police Department resulting in controversial uses of force, including an incident involving a protestor who was critically injured by a police officer after allegedly being struck in the head by a specialty impact munition and/or a tear gas canister. The Aftermath of October 25th In the wake of these events, serious concerns were raised by both City Officials and by the community at large concerning use of unnecessary force, overall police performance, and OPD’s ability to manage future events in an acceptable manner. The ability of OPD to effectively and impartially investigate the widely reported allegations of police use of force and other misconduct was also questioned. In response to this need for an impartial review of the events of October 25th, the City of Oakland contracted Frazier Group, LLC on December 19, 2011. We are pleased to present the following report, completed under the terms of this contract. Details: Oakland, CA: Frazier Group, 2012. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 28, 2012 at www2.oaklandnet.com/w/OAK036236 Year: 2012 Country: United States URL: Shelf Number: 125370 Keywords: Crowd ControlDisorderly ConductProtestsPublic DisorderRiots and Disorders (California) |
Author: Davies, Toby P. Title: A Mathematical Model of the London Riots and their Policing Summary: In August 2011, several areas of London experienced episodes of large-scale disorder, comprising looting, rioting and violence. Much subsequent discourse has questioned the adequacy of the police response, in terms of the resources available and strategies used. In this article, we present a mathematical model of the spatial development of the disorder, which can be used to examine the effect of varying policing arrangements. The model is capable of simulating the general emergent patterns of the events and focusses on three fundamental aspects: the apparently-contagious nature of participation; the distances travelled to riot locations; and the deterrent effect of policing. We demonstrate that the spatial configuration of London places some areas at naturally higher risk than others, highlighting the importance of spatial considerations when planning for such events.Wealso investigate the consequences of varying police numbers and reaction time, which has the potential to guide policy in this area. Details: London: University College London, 2013. 9p. Source: Internet Resource: Scientific Reports: Accessed March 1, 2013 at: http://www.nature.com/srep/2013/130221/srep01303/pdf/srep01303.pdf Year: 2013 Country: United Kingdom URL: http://www.nature.com/srep/2013/130221/srep01303/pdf/srep01303.pdf Shelf Number: 127748 Keywords: Crowd ControlLootingPublic DisorderPublic Order ManagementRiots (London, U.K.) |
Author: Northern Ireland. Criminal Justice Inspection Title: A Review of the Criminal Justice System’s Preparedness for Exceptional or Prolonged Public Disorder Summary: This report assesses how the criminal justice system is preparing to deal with the potential of serious, prolonged and widespread disorder associated around controversial parades, the flying of the Union flag, the G8 summit and other significant events which are due to take place in Northern Ireland during the next six months from June 2013. Our history is littered with significant outbreaks of public disorder, which on occasions has verged on anarchy. In response, policing in Northern Ireland has developed a history and tradition for managing the impacts of such violence, and the wider criminal justice system has, to varying degrees, dealt with the eventual consequences. However we are in a different era where successful public sector organisations now invest heavily in developing their strategic planning capability. It is no different for the police, and risk assessment and risk management processes are key influences in developing an overall strategy for dealing with significant events which may result in public disorder. There is an expectation that the strategic planning for such eventualities should be both extensive and up-to-date, and that issues such as capability, capacity and resilience are considered, together with the development of a broad range of contingency plans. This report finds that significant effort is being applied by the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) in preparation for the forthcoming parading season and specific events. The PSNI has increased its own capacity, and has trained and equipped officers to step up into this specialist activity. In addition, police officers from other parts of the United Kingdom were, at the time of fieldwork, to be deployed in support of the PSNI to deal specifically with the G8 summit. The planning and negotiation required to arrive at this position was extensive and while more work needed to be done prior to the summit, we were satisfied with the progress that had been made. The report highlights the need for an effective response from the wider criminal justice system to support the rule of law and to provide reassurance to the public that the agencies are working together to protect them and deal expeditiously with those who seek to destabilise our society. Details: Belfast: Criminal Justice Inspection Northern Ireland, 2013. 38p. Source: Internet Resource: accessed July 9, 2013 at: Year: 2013 Country: United Kingdom URL: Shelf Number: 129342 Keywords: Crowd ControlPublic DisorderPublic Order Management (Northern Ireland) |
Author: Blowe, Kevin Title: Olympic Policing During the 2012 Security Games Summary: In the months before the start of the 2012 Olympics in Stratford in east London, there was a growing anxiety amongst Londoners about the prospect of snipers in helicopters and RAF fighters in the skies, missile launchers on tower blocks and repeated predictions that Newham would experience lockdown during peak periods. Newham Monitoring Project had also been receiving enquiries from across east London for months from local residents, particularly those working with young people, who were concerned about the massive proposed policing operation and its impact at street level. London 2012 seemed to deserve its reputation as the first 'Security Games'. The Olympics presented the largest peacetime military and security operation since 1945, with a policing and security budget of around L553m. From 2010, the number of security personnel required by Olympic organisers rose sharply to an estimated 23,700 on the busiest days, more than double the original predictions, with up to 12,000 police from forces across the country and the Ministry of Defence providing more troops deployed (in uniform) to work during the Games than were then stationed in Afghanistan. Even more CCTV was installed in a city that already had the highest level of surveillance of its citizens than anywhere in the world, whilst around $80 million was spent on the construction of an 11-mile long 5000-volt electric fence around the Olympic zone. The reason for this extraordinary level of security, the Home Office argued in its March 2011 publication 'Olympic and Paralympic Safety and Security Strategy,' was primarily the threat from terrorism: it promised 'maximum use of existing national security and intelligence structures' with the threat-level raised from 'substantial' to 'severe' (which assumes 'an attack is highly likely'). A secondary threat was public disorder, heightened by the perception of a weak police response to rioting the previous summer that followed the death of Mark Duggan in August 2011. The International Olympic Committee had made it clear after the riots that it expected the British government, the Metropolitan police and other domestic agencies to ensure that the Olympics passed off without incident. Arrangements were made to fast-track the trials of people accused of offences linked to the Olympics in the same highly controversial way that had followed the disorder of the previous year, with Alison Saunders, the chief CPS prosecutor for London, explicitly linking these measures to 'the lessons of the summer riots.' With a climate of fear slowly building through state institutions and the media, we were also aware of the significant pattern of racialised social "sanitisation" and exploitation that have been a hallmark of sport mega events globally, particularly where they have been held in poorer and developing areas. Activists and academics from countries including South Africa and India, which have both hosted major sport events in recent years, travelled to the UK to share their experiences of human rights abuses and 'sweep up operations' in their localities. These had had a massively detrimental and often devastating impact on the lives of local people, leaving them homeless, unemployed or vulnerable to excessive policing or criminalisation, with a legacy of property developers and real estate owners benefiting most. These were real life stories behind the promises of employment and regeneration that had been made in each host city. We recognised that an atmosphere of intensive security, focused on the borough where Newham Monitoring Project has worked for over thirty years, had the potential to negatively impact on local people. Most military and all private security personnel would work inside the 'ticketed areas' of the event venues, but in the streets surrounding the Olympic Park in Stratford and the ExCel Centre in Canning Town, it was the prospect of a massive policing operation that was our greatest concern. Newham is one of London's poorest and most ethnically diverse boroughs with the second highest Muslim population in the UK, one that had experienced long-term state surveillance, suspicion and incidents like the bungled anti-terrorism raids in 2006 on two families living in Forest Gate, who endured a terrifying ordeal based on faulty intelligence. The borough also has one of the youngest populations in London, with 23.6% of residents in 2011 aged between 10 and 24,6 coupled with a long history of difficult relationships between young people and the police. This is particularly the case over the use of stop and search powers. Details: London: Newham Monitoring Project, 2013. 29p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 24, 2014 at: http://netpol.files.wordpress.com/2013/12/monitoring-the-security-games-final-report.pdf Year: 2013 Country: United Kingdom URL: http://netpol.files.wordpress.com/2013/12/monitoring-the-security-games-final-report.pdf Shelf Number: 132168 Keywords: Event SecurityOlympic GamesPolicing DemonstrationsPublic DisorderSporting Events |
Author: CNA Analysis & Solutions Title: Managing Large-Scale Security Events: A Planning Primer for Local Law Enforcement Agencies Summary: When law enforcement executives are tasked with managing a large event, they can maximize their efforts by learning from other agencies and adopting proven practices. Too often, however, past lessons learned are not documented in a clear and concise manner. To address this information gap, the U.S. Department of Justice's Bureau of Justice Assistance worked in partnership with CNA to develop this planning primer. This planning primer synthesizes salient best practices pertaining to security planning for a large-scale event, specifically pre-event planning, core event operations, and post-event activities. The planning primer includes detailed information on 18 core operational areas that law enforcement executives can give to lead law enforcement planners as supplemental guidance. This guidance can be used as a foundation for coordinating area-specific operational plans and can be modified to accommodate event security requirements and existing protocols. Furthermore, supplementing each operational area presented in the planning primer are actionable templates, checklists, and key considerations designed to facilitate the planning process. Details: Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Assistance, 2013. 225p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 26, 2015 at: https://www.cna.org/sites/default/files/research/Planning-Primer.pdf Year: 2013 Country: United States URL: https://www.cna.org/sites/default/files/research/Planning-Primer.pdf Shelf Number: 129782 Keywords: Crowd ControlDemonstrationsEmergency PreparednessPublic DisorderRiots |
Author: Nolan, Paul Title: The Flag Dispute: Anatomy of a Protest Summary: On 3 December 2012, Belfast City Council voted to restrict the flying of the Union flag at the City Hall to 18 designated days each year. The decision sparked a riot on the night the vote was taken, and was followed by four months of street protests. Moreover, the arguments over this particular policy have continued up to the present day. The report aims to dispassionately analyse these events to see what important lessons can be learned. This study has involved interviews with approximately 60 people (and conversations with hundreds), a comprehensive trawl of print and broadcast media, an examination of social media, statistical analysis of data provided by the Public Prosecution Service, extensive use of PSNI records, and the creation of a detailed data base of all events during the period December 2012 and March 2013. The researchers have scrutinised both the qualitative and quantitative data and critically analysed the findings in order to present this account. Details: Belfast: Queen's University, Institute for the Study of Conflict Transformation and Social Justice, 2014. 145p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 14, 2015 at: http://www.qub.ac.uk/research-centres/isctsj/filestore/Filetoupload,481119,en.pdf Year: 2014 Country: United Kingdom URL: http://www.qub.ac.uk/research-centres/isctsj/filestore/Filetoupload,481119,en.pdf Shelf Number: 136413 Keywords: Crowd Control Demonstrations and Protests Public DisorderRiots |
Author: Gilmore, Joanna Title: Report on the Policing of the Barton Moss Community Protection Camp: November 2013 - April 2014 Summary: In a collaboration between the University of York's Centre for Urban Research (CURB) and LJMU's Centre for the Study of Crime, Criminalisation and Social Exclusion (CCSE), researchers investigated the policing of Barton Moss Community Protection Camp in Salford, Greater Manchester. From November 2013 to April 2014, the camp promoted a campaign of peaceful protest to raise awareness of the potential environmental dangers of exploratory hydraulic fracturing (fracking) taking place in the area. Protest activities included 'slow walking' in front of vehicles accessing the site and other forms of non-violent direct action, as well as rallies, hosting music events, and family days. Amid conflicting media accounts of violence attributed to both protestors and Greater Manchester Police (GMP), researchers at York and LJMU made a series of visits to the camp, conducted interviews with camp residents and analysed figures from ongoing criminal justice cases of those arrested. The research aimed to provide a rare insight into the experiences of anti-fracking protesters. The report is grounded in the experiences of camp residents and supporters, and the researchers concluded that independence from GMP in this research was essential to their gaining access to the camp and the lawyers involved in the ongoing cases. Documenting concerns about the nature, function and proportionality of the policing operation at the camp, and the deployment of policing methods, the peer-reviewed report provides a range of findings and recommendations. These include: - The protest at Barton Moss was overwhelmingly peaceful and non-violent - The nature and scale of the policing operation was found to be disproportionate to the activities of the camp. Policing tactics had the effect of undermining the rights of those protesting peacefully, meaning GMP failed in their obligation to facilitate peaceful protest as stated by the European Convention on Human Rights. - GMP officers - from planning stages to conclusion - prioritised the commercial interests of the fracking company over the right of local residents and supporters to exercise their right to protest - The communication strategy of GMP focused primarily on justifying the policing operation and questioning the legitimacy of the protest rather than providing the public with clear information about the protest and policing operation. - The overwhelming majority (98 percent) of arrests made at Barton Moss were for non-violent offences. These figures cast doubt on the legitimacy of GMP's characterisation of the protest in public statements made during the policing operation. - Two thirds (66 percent) of arrested protesters have had their cases dropped, dismissed or been found not guilty by the courts. This conviction rate is significantly lower than that occurring within the criminal justice system as a whole. - Police bail powers were routinely abused in order to restrict the right to protest - Overall, the cumulative impact of these processes showcases the routine abuse of police powers at the expense of protesters' civil liberties Details: Centre for the Study of Crime, Criminalisation and Social Exclusion, Liverpool John Moores University Centre for URBan Research (CURB), University of York, 2016. 56p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 15, 2016 at: https://curbyork.files.wordpress.com/2016/02/bm_final_170216_email.pdf Year: 2016 Country: United Kingdom URL: https://curbyork.files.wordpress.com/2016/02/bm_final_170216_email.pdf Shelf Number: 138244 Keywords: Crowd ControlOffenses Against the EnvironmentProtestsPublic DisorderPublic Order Management |
Author: Apraxine, Pierre Title: Urban Violence and Humanitarian Challenges Summary: This second colloquium organised jointly by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS) aimed to present the causes and humanitarian consequences of urban violence, as well as related trends and challenges for the European Union and humanitarian actors. Two case studies have been selected, focusing on different types of violence affecting urban environments. The first case study examines pilot projects to address humanitarian needs arising from organised crime and gang violence in megacities; the second is an analysis of the humanitarian challenges emerging from urban violence in the context of uprisings, referring specifically to the lessons learned from the protests in the Arab world. Urban violence represents numerous challenges for policy makers and humanitarian actors alike. Today, more than half of the world's population lives in cities and it appears that urban centres will absorb almost all new population growth in the coming decades. It has therefore become increasingly important to understand the dynamics of violence in an urban setting. By bringing together experts, academics and representatives from various relief organisations, the ICRC and the EUISS hope to have contributed to the debate and spurred further interest in this increasingly important issue. The present publication includes summaries of both the presentations provided by the speakers and the discussions held during the colloquium. Details: Paris: EU Institute for Security Studies, 2012. 88p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 16, 2016 at: http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/Urban_violence_and_humanitarian_challenges.pdf Year: 2012 Country: Europe URL: http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/Urban_violence_and_humanitarian_challenges.pdf Shelf Number: 125774 Keywords: Gang ViolenceNeighborhoods and CrimeOrganized CrimePublic DisorderUrban Areas and CrimeUrban Violence |
Author: American Civil Liberties Union Title: Summary: In June 2010, hundreds of thousands of Canadians took to the streets of Toronto to peacefully protest the G20 Summit, which was taking place behind a fortified fence that walled off much of the city's downtown core. On the Saturday evening during the Summit weekend, a senior Toronto Police Commander sent out an order - "take back the streets." Within a span of 36 hours, over 1000 people - peaceful protesters, journalists, human rights monitors and downtown residents - were arrested and placed in detention. The title of this publication is taken from that initial police order. It is emblematic of a very concerning pattern of government conduct: the tendency to transform individuals exercising a fundamental democratic right - the right to protest - into a perceived threat that requires a forceful government response. The case studies detailed in this report, each written by a different domestic civil liberties and human rights organization, provide contemporary examples of different governments' reactions to peaceful protests. They document instances of unnecessary legal restrictions, discriminatory responses, criminalization of leaders, and unjustifiable - at times deadly - force. The nine organizations that have contributed to this publication work to defend basic democratic rights and freedoms in nine countries spread over four continents. Across the regions where our organizations operate, States are engaged in concerted efforts to roll back advances in the protection and promotion of human rights - and often, regressive measures impacting the right to protest follows in lockstep. And across the globe, social movements are pushing for change and resisting the advancement of authoritarian policies; dozens, hundreds, thousands or hundreds of thousands of individuals are marching in the roads and occupying the public space. In rural areas across the global south, there are a variety of demands, calling for access to land or resisting the exploitation of natural resources that threaten indigenous peoples' or peasants' territories. In urban settings, housing shortages or lack of basic services spark social protests and upheavals. Even in developed economies, there are disturbing tensions provoked by the contraction of the economy, globalization policies and the social and political exclusion of migrants. Students' movements all over the globe are demanding the right to education. History tells us that many of the fundamental rights we enjoy today were obtained after generations before us engaged in sustained protests in the streets: the prohibition against child labor, steps toward racial equality, women's suffrage - to name just a few - were each accomplished with the help of public expression of these demands. If freedom of expression is the grievance system of democracies, the right to protest and peaceful assembly is democracy's megaphone. It is the tool of the poor and the marginalized - those who do not have ready access to the levers of power and influence, those who need to take to the streets to make their voices heard. Unfortunately, these are also rights that are frequently violated. Our organizations have witnessed numerous instances of direct state repression during protests: mass arrests, unlawful detentions, illegal use of force and the deployment of toxic chemicals against protesters and bystanders alike. At other times the state action is less visible: the increased criminalization of protest movements, the denial of march permits, imposition of administrative hurdles and the persecution and prosecution of social leaders and protesters. Details: New York: ACLU, 2013. 35p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 13, 2016 at: https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/global_protest_suppression_report_inclo.pdf Year: 2013 Country: International URL: https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/global_protest_suppression_report_inclo.pdf Shelf Number: 139432 Keywords: Civil RightsProtests and DemonstrationsPublic Disorder |
Author: Bruce, David Title: Commissioners and commanders: Police leadership and the Marikana massacre Summary: This monograph examines the functioning of the police system, with a focus on the leadership and command levels, in the build-up to the Marikana massacre on 16 August 2012, when police killed 34 miners who were striking at the Lonmin platinum mine at Marikana. It considers events up to about 15:30 on Thursday, 16 August, which is when police launched their tactical intervention during which the massacre took place. The monograph examines decision making and the exercise of authority and influence by senior leadership of the South African Police Service (the SAPS), particularly the senior national and provincial leaders (National Commissioner Phiyega and North West Provincial Commissioner Zukiswa Mbombo), and senior SAPS commanders (Major Generals Mpembe and Annandale). The key findings of the Marikana Commission are summarised, followed by an overview of the conflict at the mine in August 2012. This conflict involved the strikers, mine management and two unions, the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) and the Association of Mineworkers and Construction Union (AMCU). The monograph outlines some of the aspects of this conflict, including questions about the political alignment of the parties involved and how the strike, launched on Thursday 9 August, rapidly escalated into violence. The monograph then focuses on two critical shifts in the SAPS approach to the Marikana situation. Both these shifts were linked to the involvement of SAPS senior leaders, Phiyega and Mbombo, and are likely to have been influenced by their interactions with Minister of Police Nathi Mthethwa. The first shift was on Monday, 13 August, after two SAPS members were killed by strikers. The strike then became the focus of intense national political and media attention; national police commanders, planners and units were brought in and Public Order Police (POP) commanders were marginalised from the command system. The second shift was a decision made on Wednesday, 15 August, that police would take action against the strikers on the following day if the strikers refused to disarm. The section on operational matters focuses on some of the nuts and bolts of the operation. A discussion of the planning of the intervention is relevant to examining how the police understood the situation they were confronting. This is followed by an analysis of the negotiation process that focused on persuading the strikers to disarm. It examines the fact that the strikers refused to disarm unless Lonmin negotiated with them. The SAPS conveyed the strikers’ message to Lonmin but refrained from exerting any pressure on Lonmin to comply with the strikers' request. This section of the monograph examines how the decision taken by SAPS senior leadership on Wednesday, 15 August affected both the planning and negotiations processes. It also informs the analysis of the actions of the SAPS commanders that follows. The penultimate section of the monograph focuses on the role the two senior commanders, Mpembe and Annandale, played in the operation before the tactical intervention. It explores the role they played in implementing the decision that had been made by the SAPS senior leadership that Wednesday, and whether they exercised their authority appropriately in this respect. The conclusion draws together this discussion with a focus on questions raised in the monograph about the SAPS commanders at Marikana. It recognises that their actions were affected not only by the senior leadership decision made on Wednesday but also by shifts in the nature of the operation that took place on the Monday prior to this. These not only created ambiguity about what type of operation was being conducted but also resulted in a blurring of lines of authority. The monograph ends by highlighting key issues raised, including: • Police positioning in relation to social conflict and the potential impact of political pressure. • Ensuring that senior leaders of the SAPS, as well as other people in leadership roles, are appropriately qualified. • The nature of decision making in the SAPS. • How leadership and command are exercised in large-scale public order and crowd management operations as well as minimum standards for ensuring that such operations are carried out professionally and conform with crowd management principles. • The need for the SAPS to recognise the principle that, in actions by the police where the use of lethal force is anticipated police should seek to resolve situations effectively while minimising the potential for having to use lethal force. The principle applies to all police actions of this kind and not only to crowd management. Details: Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2017. 66p. Source: Internet Resource: ISS Monograph No. 194: Accessed February 13, 2017 at: https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/mono194-2.pdf Year: 2017 Country: South Africa URL: https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/mono194-2.pdf Shelf Number: 140903 Keywords: Crowd ControlPolice AdministrationPolice BehaviorPolice Decision-MakingPolice PerformancePolice Use of ForcePublic Disorder |
Author: Feinberg, Matthew Title: Extreme Protest Tactics Reduce Popular Support for Social Movements Summary: Social movements are critical agents of change that vary greatly in both tactics and popular support. Prior work shows that extreme protest tactics - actions that are highly counter-normative, disruptive, or harmful to others, including inflammatory rhetoric, blocking traffic, and damaging property - are effective for gaining publicity. However, we find across three experiments that extreme protest tactics decreased popular support for a given cause because they reduced feelings of identification with the movement. Though this effect obtained in tests of popular responses to extreme tactics used by animal rights, Black Lives Matter, and anti-Trump protests (Studies 1-3), we found that self-identified political activists were willing to use extreme tactics because they believed them to be effective for recruiting popular support (Studies 4a & 4b). The activist's dilemma - wherein tactics that raise awareness also tend to reduce popular support - highlights a key challenge faced by social movements struggling to affect progressive change. Details: Toronto: University of Toronto - Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management, 2017. 58p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 15, 2017 at: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2911177 Year: 2017 Country: United States URL: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2911177 Shelf Number: 145789 Keywords: Protest MovementsPublic DisorderRiots and Protests |
Author: Implementation Agency for Crime and Security (IMPACS) Title: CARICOM Crime and Security Strategy 2013: Securing the Region Summary: I. The ideals of the CARICOM integration movement and the pillars of its foundation can only be realised in a safe and secure Community. The CARICOM Crime and Security Strategy (CCSS) constitutes an historic and defining moment for the Community in clearly articulating its security interests within the wider context of the shifting balance of global geopolitical power, increasing market competitiveness, public debt financing and profound economic uncertainties, threats of climate change and scarcity of key resources.This current situation is further exacerbated by profound influence of new technology and social media, the increasingly asymmetric nature of conflict, and the growing power of non-state actors, including transnational organized crime. II. The multidimensional and multifaceted nature of the risks and threats faced by CARICOM Member States are increasingly interconnected, cross-cutting, network-centric and transnational. The repercussions of emerging threats now propagate rapidly around the world, so that events in any part of the world are now far more likely to have immediate consequences for the Caribbean region. This rapidly - evolving set of security scenarios - and the absence of a common analysis of the risks and threats that affect CARICOM Member States - make this Strategy vitally necessary. III. The Council of Ministers Responsible for National Security and Law Enforcement (CONSLE) at its 5th Meeting mandated the CARICOM Implementation Agency for Crime and Security (IMPACS) to develop a "Regional Crime and Security Strategy" (hereafter called the CARICOM Crime and Security Strategy). IV. The Strategy is guided by the principles and values of democratic choice, freedom, justice, prosperity, respect for territorial integrity, respect for and promotion of human rights and good governance all of which reflect the deepest convictions of the Community. V. The goal of the CARICOM Crime and Security Strategy is to significantly improve citizen security by creating a safe, just and free Community, while simultaneously improving the economic viability of the Region. VI. The Strategy identifies and prioritises the common security risks and threats which CARICOM is facing now, and likely to face in the future. It articulates an integrated and cohesive security framework to confront these challenges,and will therefore guide the coordinated internal and external crime and security policies adopted by CARICOM Member States, under their respective legal frameworks to the fullest extent. VII. The risks and threats identified in the CARICOM Crime and Security Strategy are prioritised into four (4) Tiers: • Tier 1 -Immediate Significant Threats. These are high-probability, high-impact events. They are the currentand present dangers. • Tier 2 - Substantial Threats. These are both likely and high-impact, but are not as severe as Tier 1 Threats. • Tier 3 - Significant Potential Risks. These are high-impact, but low-probability. • Tier 4 - Future Risks. These are threats where the probability and impact cannot be assessed at this stage. VIII. Tier 1 Threats consist of the mutually-reinforcing relationship between transnational organised criminal activities involving illicit drugs and illegal guns; gangs and organised crime; cyber-crime; financial crimes and corruption. Tier 1 Threats are the main drivers of current criminality levels, and has the potential to cripple the already fragile socio-economic developmental progress in CARICOM and the advancement of CSME. Tier 1 Threats are the Immediate Significant Threats to the Community and are primarily responsible for the Caribbean having one of the highest homicide rates in the world -30 people killed for every 100,000 inhabitants; (compared to a world average of 5). IX. The criminality perpetuated by the Tier 1 Threats is driven by the desire and pursuit of profit, power and prestige. The criminals are supported by the facilitatorswhich consist of unscrupulous and corrupt professionals within key sectors of the economy such as the financial, legal, justice, law enforcement and security, public officials and even government officialswho help them to secure and conceal their assets. X. Organised crime depends on the facilitators of criminality. It is the facilitators who operate both in the licit and illicit world who shield organised crime and allow it to flourish. There are also a range of social factors that enable and support this criminality, including large economic disparities, poverty, the rising cost of living, social exclusion and marginalisation, unemployment and multiple governance failures. XI. Tier 2 Threats are Substantial Threats to the Region. They include human trafficking and smuggling, natural disasters and public disorder crimes. XII. Tier 3 Risks consist of Significant Potential Risks and include attacks on critical infrastructure and terrorism. XIII. Tier 4 Risks consist of Future Risks, with unknown probabilities and consequences. They include climate change, pandemics and migratory pressure. Details: Washington, DC: U.S. State Department, 2013. 63p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 17, 2017 at: https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/210844.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Caribbean URL: https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/210844.pdf Shelf Number: 146969 Keywords: Financial CrimesGangsHuman TraffickingIllegal GunsIllicit DrugsOrganized CrimePublic Disorder |
Author: Tomsen, Stephen Title: Homicide and the Night-time Economy Summary: Homicide and social patterns of alcohol use have become matters of wide concern in the Australian community. In recent years there has been particular interest in understanding and preventing attacks in commercial nightlife settings that typically involve high levels of collective drinking. Although overall rates of Australian homicide are in a long-term pattern of decline the Australian Institute of Criminology National Homicide Monitoring Program has produced a series of reports that draw out the persistent role of alcohol in homicide. This study provides evidence that homicides related to the night-time economy are not highly concentrated in locations of nightlife and heavy drinking that are usually understood as problematic sites of assaults and public disorder. Nevertheless, there is a broad persistence of after dark homicides that involve intoxication and are either directly or indirectly related to commercial night leisure. Details: Canberra: Criminology Research Council, 2016. 41p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 20, 2017 at: http://crg.aic.gov.au/reports/1617/47-1011-FinalReport.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Australia URL: http://crg.aic.gov.au/reports/1617/47-1011-FinalReport.pdf Shelf Number: 145061 Keywords: Alcohol Related Crime, DisorderHomicidesLicensed Premises Night-time EconomyPublic DisorderViolent Crime |
Author: Straub, Frank Title: Maintaining First Amendment Rights and Public Safety in North Minneapolis: An After-Action Assessment of the Police Response to Protests, Demonstrations, and Occupation of the Minneapolis Police Department's Fourth Precinct Summary: Summary of events On the morning of November 15, 2015, two Minneapolis Police Department (MPD) officers were dispatched to an assault call in a North Minneapolis neighborhood just blocks from the police department's Fourth Precinct station. Soon after arriving on scene, the officers fatally shot Jamar Clark. Following the shooting, community members marched to and organized outside the Fourth Precinct police station. Over the course of the next 18 days-from November 15 through December 3, 2015- demonstrators occupied the lawn and street in front of the Fourth Precinct. For the first three days, a group of demonstrators also occupied the front vestibule of the Fourth Precinct station. The street and the surrounding neighborhood were the site of demonstrations, open fires, noisy gatherings, and encampments. The demonstrators called for police reform, and specifically for the release of video footage from the officer-involved shooting. In the early morning hours of December 3, the occupation was successfully and peacefully resolved. After 18 days, the community response was mixed: while the large majority applauded the professionalism and restraint of the Fourth Precinct line officers, some perceived the response as overly-aggressive and unnecessarily forceful, and others questioned why the occupation was allowed to continue for 18 days. Ultimately, the total cost to the city was approximately $1.15 million. The majority of the expenses were for MPD overtime; however, there were also expenses for replacing and repairing barriers and fencing, squad repairs, and hardware replacements. Approximately $50,000 of costs to the city were in property damage. There were five injuries caused by a group of alleged White supremacists who shot into the crowd of demonstrators; however, no serious injuries were attributed to interactions between MPD officers and demonstrators. Implications and challenges Like every significant incident, the occupation posed a unique set of circumstances for city and MPD leaders-circumstances that were unpredictable and rapidly evolving. Significant challenges were associated with managing the demonstrators; the media; and the impacts of the occupation on the surrounding neighborhood, MPD employees, and their families. These issues were compounded by a police department that struggled with the command and control structure and fully implementing the National Incident Management System (NIMS) and Incident Command System (ICS), inconsistent communication, and training and equipment deficiencies. City leaders and MPD officials worked to maintain the First Amendment rights of the demonstrators while ensuring their safety, the safety of police officers, and the safety of the community as a whole. They were determined to bring a peaceful end to the occupation in a difficult national environment marred by civil disturbances spurred by officer-involved incidents in Ferguson, Baltimore, New York, and other cities nationwide. For city and law enforcement leaders, this environment reinforced their determination to exercise extreme caution throughout the response. In the end, the city and its police department brought the occupation to a peaceful conclusion and avoided the civil disturbances that occurred in other cities. Public safety response Officers throughout the MPD demonstrated extraordinary resilience and professionalism in their response to the occupation. Many officers worked long shifts and were subjected to verbal, and in some cases physical, assault. At various times, bottles, bricks, Molotov cocktails, bottles of gasoline, and other things were thrown over perimeter fences, threatening officers and damaging police vehicles and the precinct building. During the occupation, Fourth Precinct officers were instructed not to leave the building during their shifts except to provide perimeter security. Meals were brought into the station by chaplains and other volunteers. The commitment of the city, the police department, and individual officers to a peaceful, measured response played a large role in keeping the occupation from escalating into violent riots. Key themes of the review This COPS Office Critical Incident Review (CIR) of the 18-day occupation of the front lawn and the street in front of the MPD Fourth Precinct, completed by the Police Foundation, provides a comprehensive overview of the occupation from the perspectives of the MPD, elected leaders, demonstrators, and community members. The CIR identifies findings and recommendations as they relate to the response in Minneapolis, but apply more generally to civil disturbances across the nation. While the authors understand the unique set of circumstances that surround the protests and occupation of the Fourth Precinct, they also understand that the decision-making framework for the police response to this incident can and should be reviewed within the context of other significant incidents to identify important lessons that can be applied if a similar event occurs in another city, as well as to critical incidents more generally. The findings and recommendations in this report center on leadership; command and control; response to civil disorder; accountability and transparency; internal communications; public information and media; use of force; intelligence gathering; training; equipment and tools for managing demonstrations; officer safety, wellness, and resilience; and community engagement and relationships. Some of the key lessons learned include the following: -- Clearly define leadership roles and responsibilities among elected officials, law enforcement, and other agencies to ensure a coordinated and collaborative response to civil disturbance and other critical incidents. Strained relationships, lack of clearly defined roles and responsibilities, public disagreements, and lack of consistent internal communication contributed to the dynamic and varied response to this protracted incident. Unified leadership from elected officials, police executive and command staffs, and precinct personnel provides the foundation upon which a cohesive tactical and operational response is built and executed. -- Plan and exercise the unified command system for complex incidents during routine public safety response and operations. A citywide understanding and familiarization with NIMS and ICS is necessary during civil disturbances and other critical incidents to ensure coordination and collaboration among all responding agencies and individuals. Consistent implementation of unified command system principles in response to routine events and pre-planned large-scale events builds confidence in the systems and facilitates their implementation in response to mass demonstrations and critical incidents. -- Clear, concise, and consistent communication, particularly during critical incidents, is key to establishing trust and credibility. Clear, concise, and consistent communication between the Mayor's Office and the MPD, between elected officials, and within the MPD regarding the overall strategy would have led to a more coordinated and collaborative response to the occupation, provided context to the operational and tactical decisions that were made, addressed officer safety concerns, and positively impacted morale. -- Prioritize officer safety, wellness, morale, and resilience before, during, and after a critical incident such as a protracted response to civil disturbance. City and MPD leaders should have addressed and more fully accounted for the physical, mental, and emotional well-being of officers assigned to respond to the 18 days of protests, demonstrations and occupation. -- Build on positive police-community relationships to help mitigate potential future critical incident responses. The MPD 2.0 model, the training and engagement being done as part of the National Initiative for Building Community Trust and Justice, and the emphasis on positive interactions and fostering trusting partnerships should continue. Understanding and acknowledging the deep-seated racial and other issues, particularly in North Minneapolis, and building and fostering relationships with traditional and emerging community leaders will be instrumental in learning from the occupation and building opportunities to address areas of community tension and discord. Conclusion Many of the findings and recommendations that resulted from the 18-day occupation and the MPD.'s response build on an existing body of knowledge that can assist law enforcement agencies in their mission to protect, serve, and strengthen relationships with their communities. Given the unprecedented nature of the occupation, we hope that the lessons in this report will provide guidance to other agencies that may encounter similar events in the future and add to the growing body of literature that public safety agencies can use to enhance their preparation for, and response to, civil disturbances in their communities. Details: Washington, DC: U..S. Department of Justice, Office of Community Policing Services, 2014. 108p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 22, 2017 at; https://www.policefoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/Maintaining-First-Amendment-Rights-and-Public-Safety-in-North-Minneapolis.pdf Year: 2014 Country: United States URL: https://www.policefoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/Maintaining-First-Amendment-Rights-and-Public-Safety-in-North-Minneapolis.pdf Shelf Number: 146342 Keywords: Critical Incident ManagementCrowd ControlDemonstrationsOfficer-Involved ShootingPolice ProceduresPublic DemonstrationsPublic DisorderPublic SecurityRiots |
Author: Morden, John W. Title: Independent Civilian Review into Matters Relating to the G20 Summit Summary: The Independent Civilian Review into Matters Relating to the G20 Summit was launched on September 23, 2010 by the Toronto Police Services Board. The Review examined issues concerning the role the Board played with respect to the policing of the G20 Summit that was held in Toronto on June 25-27, 2010. It also examined the role played by the Toronto Police Service during the G20 Summit, with a view to determining whether the plans developed and implemented were adequate and effective for policing of the Summit. The Board appointed the Honourable John W. Morden, a former Associate Chief Justice of Ontario, to conduct the Review and provide a report and recommendations. Details: Toronto: Toronto Police Services Board, 2012. 475p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 28, 2017 at: http://www.tpsb.ca/g20/ICRG20Mordenreport.pdf Year: 2012 Country: Canada URL: http://www.tpsb.ca/g20/ICRG20Mordenreport.pdf Shelf Number: 146909 Keywords: Civilian Oversight of PoliceComplaints Against the PolicePolice Accountability Police Oversight Police Policies and PracticesPolice ReformPublic DisorderRiots and Protests |
Author: Straub, Frank Title: Advancing Charlotte: A Police Foundation Assessment of the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department Response to the September 2016 Demonstrations Summary: The September 20, 2016, officer-involved shooting of Keith Lamont Scott, and the subsequent demonstrations in Charlotte, took place within a milieu of similar events in cities across America. Protests in New York, Ferguson, North Charleston, Baltimore, Minneapolis, Baton Rouge, and Dallas demonstrated the increasing anger and frustration within communities of color and growing tension in community-police relations. In the most extreme instances, protestors destroyed property and engaged in acts of violence. While the demonstrations that took place nationally were in response to an officer(s) use of lethal force, each demonstration and the subsequent law enforcement response provides lessons learned for the involved jurisdictions, and the nation. Many of the underlying issues that precipitated the demonstrations are similar: a police officer(s) used lethal force in incidents involving individuals of color; previous officer-involved shooting incidents which remained unresolved in the eyes of the community; historical racial challenges; socioeconomic immobility; perceived accountability and transparency issues; and, fragile relationships between the police and communities of color. The protests ignited by the officer-involved shooting of Keith Lamont Scott, and similar events across the nation, "focused the collective attention [in Charlotte] on the stark racial, ethnic and economic divides that exist in ... [the] community but are rarely openly discussed." The issues and tension also created an opportunity that activists from outside the city leveraged to further their national agenda and to cause chaos in Charlotte. The influence and reach of social media fueled the embers of distrust and ignited the emotions of the community and the nation. The particular elements leading to racial violence have changed over the years. While race riots occur in the context of a convoluted mix of social, economic, and cultural factors, policing consistently remains a crucial piece of the equation. It would be overreaching to designate police action as the sole factor in race riots; nevertheless, the importance of the police in preventing and effectively responding when disorder occurs can hardly be overstated. The City of Charlotte requested that the Police Foundation conduct an independent review of the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department's (CMPD) response to the demonstrations that occurred following the September 20, 2016 officer-involved shooting. While the Police Foundation assessment team heard from the community that the issues in Charlotte go far beyond those that are within the scope of this review, the city's request demonstrates their desire to learn from these events and to use this assessment, in part, to help the city heal and move forward in a constructive manner. To ensure a comprehensive review of the incident response, the Police Foundation assessment team conducted interviews with city government officials, CMPD command staff and officers, and community leaders and members. The team also conducted a review of incident documentation and other relevant materials, as well as policy analysis. Finally, the Police Foundation assessment team conducted research on national policing best practices, model policies and promising programs to include in the report. The City of Charlotte publicly released the draft report on September 19, 2017. Since the public release of the first draft, the Police Foundation assessment team met with Mayor Roberts and members of Charlotte City Council individually, met with the City Manager, attended and presented the report at a public City Council meeting, and made note of council members' comments and requests. The assessment team also held an in-person community listening session and three meetings--one in-person and two via conference calls--with the Community Stakeholder Group. This final document reflects the comments, requests, and feedback gathered during those meetings. The Police Foundation assessment team found that the CMPD acted appropriately overall and in accordance with their policies and procedures. However, the review identified areas where the CMPD could improve its policies, practices, and operations to strengthen the department's relationship with the community it serves, with the goal of preventing and improving its response to future instances of civil unrest, should they occur. The review also highlights the importance of collaboration and communication between the City of Charlotte administration, the City Manager, and the CMPD prior to critical incidents. The report is organized by "pillars" under which critical issues are discussed and recommendations provided: - Pillar 1: Policies, Protocols & Strategies; - Pillar 2: Training & De-Escalation; - Pillar 3: Equipment & Technology; - Pillar 4: Social Media & Communication; - Pillar 5: Transparency & Accountability; and - Pillar 6: Police-Community Relationships. Communities across the country, including Charlotte, are working to address the complex issues of race, intergenerational poverty, barriers to economic opportunity, disparities in the criminal justice system, and other long-standing challenges. The City of Charlotte's political and community leaders, City Manager and the CMPD are to be commended for their genuine interest in identifying collaborative and constructive steps to acknowledge the impact of the mix of social, economic, and cultural factors that contributed to the demonstrations as well as the CMPD's efforts to prevent and respond to civil unrest. The CMPD should also be commended for the work that they have done to bridge the gap with the Charlotte Community. Their Constructive Conversations Team program can serve as a national model for tangible programs that have the potential to improve police-community relationships, both in Charlotte and elsewhere. Details: Washington, DC: Police Foundation, 2018. 103p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 8, 2018 at: https://www.policefoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/Advancing-Charlotte-Final-Report.pdf Year: 2018 Country: United States URL: https://www.policefoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/Advancing-Charlotte-Final-Report.pdf Shelf Number: 149406 Keywords: Civil DisorderDemonstrationsOfficer-Involved ShootingPolice Use of ForcePolice-Community InteractionsPolice-Community RelationsPublic DisorderPublic Order ManagementRiots and Demonstrations |
Author: Rogan, Adam Title: Risky masculinities: young men, risky drinking, public violence, and hegemonic masculinity Summary: Young men's engagement in risky drinking and public violence is now recognised as a significant public health issue for communities and societies throughout the world. These two practices often lead to a range of serious negative outcomes not only for the participants themselves, but also other individuals and wider society. Drawing on a series of focus groups and in-depth interviews conducted with young Australian men, this research examines the ways in which young men's engagement in risky drinking and public violence can be understood as a display of hegemonic masculinity. The concept of hegemonic masculinity suggests that there exists a legitimate form of masculinity within a given social and historical context that is positioned as dominant over all women, and all other forms of lesser masculinity. The aim of this research is to explore young men's understandings of risky drinking and public violence and how these practices may be drawn on to construct and perform legitimate and empowered masculine identities. Through their engagement in risky drinking and public violence, young men are able to enact culturally legitimate masculinities and distance themselves from subordinate and marginalised masculinities. The engagement of young men in these practices also sustains and reproduces gendered power inequalities that see men positioned as dominant over women, and some men positioned as dominant over others. This critical examination of the relationship between risky drinking, public violence, and hegemonic masculinity illuminates the importance of acknowledging the gendered nature of risk and risky practice, and the ways in which young men's engagement in risky practice is informed by dominant ideologies of masculinity. Details: Wollongong: University of Wollongong, 2015. 346p. Source: Internet Resource: Dissertation: Accessed June 1, 2018 at: http://ro.uow.edu.au/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=5694&context=theses Year: 2015 Country: Australia URL: http://ro.uow.edu.au/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=5694&context=theses Shelf Number: 150429 Keywords: Alcohol Related Crime, DisorderDisorderly ConductMasculinityPublic Disorder |
Author: Creedon, Mick Title: Operation Herne: Report 1: Use of Covert Identities Summary: Executive Summary History The Special Demonstration Squad (SDS) was an undercover unit formed by the Metropolitan Police's Special Branch. It operated between 1968 and 2008, during which time it infiltrated and reported on groups concerned in violent protest. Operation Herne -- Operation Herne (formerly Soisson) was formed in October 2011 in response to allegations made by the Guardian newspaper about alleged misconduct and criminality engaged in by members of the SDS. Similar matters had been previously aired as early as 2002 in a BBC documentary. Operation Riverwood -- On 4th February 2013 the Metropolitan Police received a public complaint from the family of Rod Richardson, a young boy who had died in the 1970s. It is alleged that an undercover officer working for the National Public Order Intelligence Unit (NPOIU) had used this child's details as his covert identity. This matter was referred to the IPCC. The matter was returned to the force and is currently subject of a 'local investigation'. National Public Order Intelligence Unit The NPOIU was formed within the MPS in 1999 to gather and coordinate intelligence. In 2006 the governance responsibility for NPOIU was moved to the Association of Chief Police Officers, after a decision was taken that the forces where the majority of activity was taking place should be responsible for authorising future deployments. In January 2011 the NPOIU was subsumed within other units under the National Domestic Extremism Units within the MPS. In January 1995 large numbers of police from London, Kent and Hampshire were drafted to the West Sussex harbour of Shoreham in response to protests surrounding the export of live animals to Europe. The Animal Liberation Front (ALF) and another animal extremist group named 'Justice Department' had a strong base in the community there. This led to a number of protests and in October 1995 there was a further demonstration in Brightlingsea, Essex. This resulted in a record number of police being deployed to prevent widespread public disorder. Ad-hoc protest groups emerged and the need for first hand high quality intelligence was evident. This led to undercover operatives being required to infiltrate these animal extremist organisations. The purpose of the NPOIU was: 1 To provide the police service with the ability to develop a national threat assessment and profile for domestic extremism. 2 Support the police service to reduce crime and disorder from domestic extremism. 3 Support a proportionate police response to protest activity. 4 Help the police service manage concerns of communities and businesses to minimise conflict and disorder. Control of the NPOIU moved to ACPO in 2006 under the direction of the ACPO National Co-ordinator for Domestic Extremism, Assistant Chief Constable Anton Setchell. He was replaced by Detective Chief Superintendent Adrian Tudway in 2010. The NPOIU worked with the National Extremism Tactical Co-ordination Unit (NETCU) and the National Domestic Extremism Team (NDET). The NPOIU now exists as part of the National Domestic Extremism Unit (NDEU) under the Metropolitan Police Service Specialist Operations and is run by Detective Chief Superintendent Chris Greaney. Details: Ashbourne, UK: Derbyshire Constabulary, 2013. 23p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed January 16, 2019 at: https://www.met.police.uk/SysSiteAssets/foi-media/metropolitan-police/priorities_and_how_we_are_doing/corporate/operation-herne---report-1---use-of-covert-identities Year: 2013 Country: United Kingdom URL: http://www.statewatch.org/news/2013/jul/uk-creedon-report-on-use-of-dead-childrens-names-by-undercover-unit.pdf Shelf Number: 154217 Keywords: Citizen ComplaintsCovert IdentitiesCovert OperationsNational Public Order Intelligence UnitOperation HerneOperation RiverwoodPolice MisconductPolice OfficersPublic DisorderSpecial Demonstration SquadUndercover Police |